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Is a Relational Contract a Legal Concept? 
 
Hugh Collins* 
 
 
Abstract:  The idea of a relational contract has been discussed in sociology, 
economics and law.  The concept has recently been adopted in a trilogy of decisions 
in the High Court in the United Kingdom.  The paper addresses two questions.  What 
does the idea of a relational contract mean?  If the notion of relational contract applies 
to a contract, does it have particular legal implications for the transaction, such as an 
expansion of mandatory or supplementary duties of disclosure and obligations to 
perform in good faith?  The paper proposes a concept of relational contracts that 
emphasises the economic significance of indeterminate implicit obligations and which 
supports the development of a contextual approach to interpretation and the insertion 
of implied obligations of co-operation and mutual trust and confidence.   
 
Key words: relational contract; co-operation; mutual trust and confidence; good faith; 
implicit obligations. 
 
 
1. A Legal Concept of a Relational Contract 
 
 
In the common law world, legal scholars and judges occasionally invoke the idea of a 
‘relational contract’.  The term ‘relational contract’ has been applied frequently to the 
contract of employment.1  Lord Steyn accepted this description when he said: ‘it is no 
longer right to equate a contract of employment with commercial contracts. One 
possible way of describing a contract of employment in modern terms is as a 
relational contract’.2    The idea of a relational contract has also been used in scholarly 
literature in connection with certain kinds of commercial agreements such as 
franchises, distributorships, and other kinds of long-term business relationships.3  
                                                 
* All Souls College, Oxford.  I am grateful to Mindy Chen-Wishart, Jim Malcomson, David Campbell, 
Stuart Macaulay and Bill Whitford for comments on earlier drafts.   
1
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2
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Judicial references to relational contract in connection with commercial transactions 
have, however, been sparser in the common law world.4  Recently, in three cases 
concerning commercial contracts, the English High Court has adopted the label of 
‘relational contract’ in its reasoning.  The types of commercial contracts concerned a 
distributorship for a product,5 a joint venture to exploit the digital form of educational 
materials,6 and a long-term service contract made by a private business to provide a 
county police authority with a car disposal and destruction service.7  What 
significance should be attached to this recent development in the judicial use of the 
phrase ‘relational contract’?  
 
It is possible that this usage of the label of relational contract is a passing fad that will 
soon be forgotten.  Even if it persists, it may turn out that the label has little practical 
significance.  But what importance might it have?  What would be the consequence of 
recognising the idea of a relational contract as a legal concept?  It might become a 
tight legal category of nominate contracts, like a sale of goods or a contract of 
employment, to which automatic legal consequences will be attached whenever the 
category is applicable to a particular transaction.  In the case of the sale of goods, for 
instance, it is a legal concept because its offers a description of a determinate class of 
transactions,8 and applies particular and specialised legal rules to those transactions 
within that class such as implied terms regarding title and quality of the goods.9  But 
the label of a relational contract might merely supply a looser concept that steers legal 
reasoning in particular directions, such as encouraging a more contextual approach to 
interpretation or a greater disposition to accept the existence of obligations to perform 
in good faith, without actually mandating any particular rules that should be 
applicable to the contract.  In this looser form of legal concept, it may be hard to 
identify whether the label of relational contract directs legal reasoning or merely 
summarises a result. 
 
No doubt there are good reasons to be sceptical about the prospects for the creation of 
a new legal concept.  Leaving aside the tendency of lawyers the world over to prefer 
to recycle old concepts rather than to invent new ones to deal with novel social and 
economic phenomena, there are some more immediate difficulties that this proposed 
new legal concept needs to address.  The two most obvious problems are the lack of a 
clear definition or paradigm of a relational contract and considerable uncertainty 
about what legal consequences might flow from the application of the classification to 
a particular contract.  With respect to the descriptive paradigm of a relational contract, 
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5
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9
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though there is widespread agreement that it involves a long-term business 
relationship, it is unclear for instance whether such a relationship requires a long-term 
contract that binds the parties together over a substantial period of time.    There is 
also scepticism about whether it makes sense to speak of a class of relational contracts 
as opposed to recognising that ‘relationality’ or perhaps more precisely ‘trust’ is a 
feature of all contracts, though this dimension may vary between types of transactions 
in its extent and significance.10  Assuming that a paradigm of a relational contract can 
be devised, many questions persist regarding the possible legal effects of the 
application of that classification, including the question whether there is or should be 
any legal effect at all.  In particular, the frequent suggestion that relational contracts 
require the imposition of an implied legal duty of fair dealing and performance in 
good faith is likely to provoke controversy.   
 
Before tackling those questions directly, it is helpful to examine briefly the three 
recent cases in the English High Court where the phrase ‘relational contract’ has 
apparently been used as a legal concept. Having considered that trilogy, we can then 
explore further these issues concerning the paradigm of relational contract and the 
legal consequences attached to the paradigm, before reaching a conclusion as to 
whether relational contract is now a legal concept.  That exploration will draw heavily 
on research in sociology and economics, where the concept of a relational contract has 
been widely employed.   
 
 
 
2. The Trilogy of Relational Contracts 
 
Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd11 
 
The Yam Seng case concerned a contract for the distribution of bottles of fragrances 
and other toiletries primarily through duty free shops in airports in South East Asia.  
The brand of the fragrances was ‘Manchester United’ and the packaging used the 
insignia of the soccer team.  Given the worldwide popularity of the brand name, 
presumably it was expected that consumers would purchase the products as a way of 
identifying with their heroes.  (I can imagine the advertising catch-phrase: ‘I go all 
swooney when you smell like Wayne Rooney’; or perhaps ‘Man U smell good’).  The 
contract between the two businessmen, trading as small companies, was brief and 
relatively informal, but it described how the defendant had a worldwide license to 
manufacture and sell fragrances under the Manchester United brand name and that the 
claimant would have exclusive rights to market the fragrances in particular locations 
including some duty-free shops in airports in south east Asia.  As well as complaining 
about misrepresentations made by the defendant prior to entry into the contract, the 
claimant argued that the defendant had committed a breach of contract when it 
permitted sales of the branded fragrances in ordinary shopping outlets in Singapore at 
                                                 
10
 David Campbell, ‘Arcos v Ronaasen as a Relational Contract’ in David Campbell, Linda Mulcahy 
and Sally Wheeler (eds), Changing Concepts of Contract (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 138; David 
Campbell, ‘The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract’ in David Campbell and Peter 
Vincent-Jones (eds), Contract and Economic Organisation: Socio-legal Initiatives (Dartmouth 1996); 
Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP, 1999) 141. 
11
 Yam Seng (n 5). 
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prices as much as 20% below those specified for sales in the duty free airport outlets 
where the claimant was marketing the products.   
 
Leggatt J found that although the defendant had not deliberately permitted this under-
cutting of the prices charged in the duty free shops by other distributors, he had failed 
to cooperate either by stopping the undercutting or by alerting the claimant to his 
inability to prevent it.  This failure undermined the business model of this particular 
distributorship under which the claimant would be able to market the goods in duty-
free outlets at slightly discounted prices and it also put him in breach of contract with 
the duty-free retailers.  Although the case was decided in favour of the claimant on the 
ground of misrepresentation, Leggatt J also held that there was a repudiatory breach 
of contract based on breach of an implied term requiring honest conduct, because ‘the 
nature of the dishonesty, on a matter of commercial importance…, was … such as to 
strike at the heart of the trust which is vital to any long term commercial relationship, 
particularly one which is dependent as this relationship was on the mutual trust of two 
individuals.’12  The reasoning in this case seems to proceed from a finding that the 
distribution agreement was a relational contract, to the insertion of implied term 
requiring good faith in the sense of honest disclosure of material information needed 
for the success of the commercial enterprise by maintaining trust. 
 
Leggatt J described a relational contract as ‘a longer term relationship between the 
parties to which they make a substantial commitment’.13   In addition, Leggatt J 
pointed to an implicit understanding of the parties founded on a perception of what is 
necessary to give business efficacy to their transaction that they will communicate, 
co-operate, not act in a way to destroy mutual trust and confidence, and be loyal.  The 
particular implied legal obligation that Leggatt J envisaged as arising from this 
relational contract seems to have been a duty to disclose information that was vital to 
the success of the business operation, breach of which harmed the interests of the 
claimant without any compensating advantage to the defendant, since he did not 
benefit from the higher retail sales price in the high street, and so the defendant’s 
conduct failed to defend this distributorship against its competitors.  In other words, 
there had been a clear breach of an implied term requiring loyalty to the purpose of 
the contract and co-operation through being honest and keeping the other party 
properly informed. 
 
                                                 
12
 Ibid [171]. 
13
 Ibid [171]. ‘In some contractual contexts the relevant background expectations may extend further to 
an expectation that the parties will share information relevant to the performance of the contract such 
that a deliberate omission to disclose such information may amount to bad faith. English law has 
traditionally drawn a sharp distinction between certain relationships - such as partnership, trusteeship 
and other fiduciary relationships - on the one hand, in which the parties owe onerous obligations of 
disclosure to each other, and other contractual relationships in which no duty of disclosure is supposed 
to operate. Arguably at least, that dichotomy is too simplistic. While it seems unlikely that any duty to 
disclose information in performance of the contract would be implied where the contract involves a 
simple exchange, many contracts do not fit this model and involve a longer term relationship between 
the parties which they make a substantial commitment. Such "relational" contracts, as they are 
sometimes called, may require a high degree of communication, cooperation and predictable 
performance based on mutual trust and confidence and involve expectations of loyalty which are not 
legislated for in the express terms of the contract but are implicit in the parties' understanding and 
necessary to give business efficacy to the arrangements. Examples of such relational contracts might 
include some joint venture agreements, franchise agreements and long term distributorship 
agreements.’ 
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Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd & Ors14 
 
The phrase ‘relational contract’ was next applied in Bristol Groundschool to a 
contract that may best be described as a kind of joint venture. The claimant had 
developed a business of writing and publishing training manuals for pilots.  To create 
and exploit a digital version of the product, the claimant entered into a contract with 
the defendant, who turned the manuals into digital form with some added 
functionality.  The parties published the digital manuals jointly and agreed to share 
the costs of production equally.  The defendant received a royalty fee of £200 on 
every copy sold.  As the relationship slowly soured, in anticipation of termination of 
the joint venture, the claimant secretly accessed the defendant’s database via a VPN 
network link, which had been provided for other purposes, in order to download 
digital materials.  A year later, after the relationship became extremely acrimonious, 
the joint venture fell apart and the claimant used the downloaded files to link up with 
another supplier to continue the digital side of the business.    
 
One issue before the court was whether the secret download via the VPN was a 
breach of contract.  There was no express term that covered this question.  Richard 
Spearman QC, acting as a judge in the Chancery Division, cited the decision and 
description of relational contract in Yam Seng with approval, and concluded that this 
joint venture was also a relational contract.  It fell within the description of a 
relational contract because the joint venture was a long-term relationship, to which the 
parties had both made financial commitments, and in the evidence of the parties 
during the trial it was acknowledged that they needed to act towards each other in a 
trustworthy and honest way.  The judge held that, as the contract was a relational 
contract, there was an implied term requiring good faith in performance.  In this 
context, the requirement of good faith was greater than honesty. The relevant test was 
that of conduct that would be regarded as "commercially unacceptable" by reasonable 
and honest people in the particular context involved,15  a standard that the defendant 
had breached. 
 
 
D&G Cars Ltd v Essex Police Authority 16   
 
The third recent decision in which the label of ‘relational contract’ was attached to a 
commercial contract was D&G Cars Ltd v Essex Police Authority.  This contract was 
a five year franchise or exclusive license under which the police authority granted a 
private contractor the right to dispose of cars in accordance with the police authority’s 
instructions.  These cars might have been stolen, involved in an accident, owned by 
someone without insurance, used in evidence in a case, or in some other way come 
into the possession of the police. Instead of crushing one car completely, as instructed 
by the police authority, the contractor used the vehicle as a ‘ringer’ to demonstrate to 
staff how the chassis and parts of vehicles could be exchanged without detection, and 
then an apparently almost new car could be created out of older parts. As a result of a 
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 Bristol Groundschool (n 6). 
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tip-off, it was discovered that the car that had been sent to be crushed was a different 
one, albeit with the correct transferred registration and chassis numbers, and that the 
claimant was using the condemned car for its own business. On discovering this 
disobedience or carelessness in carrying out instructions, the police authority removed 
the franchise and excluded the contractor from bidding for a new one.   The claimant 
argued that this termination was a fundamental breach of contract and sought damages 
of about £1 million, whereas the defendant insisted that it had merely accepted the 
claimant’s repudiatory breach of contract. 
 
Dove J described this contract as ‘a relational contract par excellence’.17  It was a 
long-term contract and relationship; the court stressed the need for the contractor to 
act with integrity and honesty in carrying out the instructions of the police authority, 
which itself was acting on behalf of the public in dealing with these cars.  In addition, 
the cars were never the property of the contractor, but were owned by the registered 
owner or had been confiscated by a legal process, so the contractor had to take care of 
the cars, especially if it was required eventually to return a vehicle to its owner.   In 
this case the implied term was described not as one of good faith but rather as a term 
that the parties would act with honesty and integrity in operating the contract.18  Dove 
J. explained his use of different language as setting a standard that was not merely 
about dishonest behaviour but concerned conduct that was inconsistent with the 
maintenance of the long-term relationship.19 It is noticeable that some of the language 
used to describe the implied term in this case invoked the implied term found in 
contracts of employment, namely the obligation on employers (and employees), not to 
act, without good reason, in a manner likely to destroy mutual trust and confidence 
between the parties.20  The court concluded on the facts that there had been a serious 
breach of the express term in relation to following the disposal instructions of the 
defendant and a breach of the implied term of honesty and integrity, even if it were 
the case that the conduct of the contractor had not been deliberately dishonest and 
fraudulent.21   
 
The Emerging Legal Concept of a Relational Contract 
 
This trilogy of cases supports the claim that the idea of a relational contract is being 
used as a legal concept in the sense that the judges have in mind a descriptive 
paradigm of a relational contract and, having identified the existence of a relational 
contract, they are prepared for that reason to imply contractual obligations such as 
duties of fair dealing, good faith, and mutual trust and confidence.   But much remains 
                                                 
17
 Ibid [176] 
18
 Ibid [176] 
19
 Ibid [175] ‘By the use of the term 'integrity', rather as Leggatt J uses the term 'good faith', the 
intention is to capture the requirements of fair dealing and transparency which are no doubt required 
(and would, to the parties, go without saying) in a contract which creates a long-standing relationship 
between the parties lasting some years and which has the qualities and features to which I shall turn 
shortly. There may well be acts which breach the requirement of undertaking the contract with integrity 
which it would be difficult to characterise definitively as dishonest. Such acts would compromise the 
mutual trust and confidence between the parties in this long-term relationship without necessarily 
amounting to the telling of lies, stealing or other definitive examples of dishonest behaviour. They 
would amount to behaviour which the parties would, had they been asked, have identified as obvious 
acts which were inconsistent with the maintenance of their intended long-term relationship of fair and 
open dealing and therefore would amount to a breach of their contract.’ 
20
 Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1997] ICR 606, [1998] AC 20 (HL). 
21
 D & G Cars n 7 [203]-[205]. 
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to be clarified.  A relational contract is still an incipient legal concept, for which the 
details need to be fleshed out rather more.   
 
What are the elements of the descriptive paradigm of a relational contract that are 
being used in these cases?  Drawing together the threads of the definition used in 
these cases, we can observe that emphasis is placed on the following four features of 
the transaction which draw it into the paradigm of a relational contract. 
 
(1) A longer-term business relationship; 
(2) Investment of substantial resources by both parties; 
(3) Implicit expectations of cooperation and loyalty that shape performance 
obligations in order to give business efficacy to the project; 
(4) Implicit expectations of mutual trust and confidence going beyond the 
avoidance of dishonesty.   
 
These elements in the paradigm provide a useful start, though they require further 
refinement and elaboration before they can provide us with a workable paradigm of a 
relational contract. 
 
With respect to the legal rules that arise from the application of the concept of a 
relational contract, in these cases the legal consequence has been the development of 
an implied term, breach of which is treated as a repudiatory breach of contract.  The 
terms implied into these relational contracts concerning good faith, fair dealing, and 
mutual trust and confidence are certainly not regarded by the High Court as the same 
as fiduciary duties, but nor are they merely a rudimentary requirement of honest 
conduct, such a duty to refrain from fraud, which in any event is likely to be applied 
as a bare minimum standard to every contract.22  The precise content of the duties 
inserted by implied terms into relational contracts will evidently depend on the 
context and purpose of the transaction, the express undertakings made by the parties, 
and the acknowledged implicit expectations of the parties.  But two elements of these 
implicit obligations stand out: expectations of cooperation and loyalty in order to give 
business efficacy to this kind of transaction, and the avoidance of actions likely to 
destroy mutual trust and confidence between the parties.  Although Leggatt J 
described these implied terms as terms implied in fact or ad hoc terms suitable for a 
particular contract, this characterisation may turn out to be inaccurate. If it becomes 
the practice of the courts to insert such terms routinely into contracts that have been 
labelled as relational contracts, it seems that the terms would be more properly 
classified ones that are implied by law into all contracts of this type.23    
 
 
 
3. Lessons from Social Sciences? 
 
Although more instruction can be derived from these cases, at this point it is helpful to 
consider the insights of the scholarly literature regarding relational contracts in the 
                                                 
22
 HIH Casualty v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 61 (HL); Bhasin v Hyrnew 2014 SCC 
71, [2015] 4 LRC 85 (SC Canada). 
23
 For the contrast between terms implied in fact and terms implied by law and how these 
classifications can be manipulated see: Elizabeth Peden, ‘Policy Concerns behind Implications in Law’ 
(2001) LQR 459; Hugh Collins, ‘Implied Terms: The Foundation in Good Faith and Fair Dealing’ 
(2014) 67 CLP 297, 301-309. 
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social sciences.  Unlike legal scholars, sociologists and economists tend not to be 
much interested in the normative implications of their analyses or what legal rules 
should apply to a particular case.  But their interest in the empirical practices of 
transactions has the potential to offer insights regarding the special characteristics of 
relational contracts beyond those mentioned in the above trilogy of cases.  These 
insights should assist in constructing a legal paradigm for relational contracts and may 
offer indirect guidance on the issue of the appropriate legal and regulatory framework 
to govern relational contracts.  In pursuit of that purpose, we will consider briefly 
three strands in that literature: the sociology of embedded exchange; the economics of 
self-enforcing contracts or relational contracts; and the institutional economics theory 
of quasi-integration.   
 
 
The Sociology of Embedded Exchange 
 
The work of Ian Macneil launched the concept of a relational contract.24 Although he 
was a professor of law, his perspective on contracts was thoroughly sociological.  
Macneil’s views evolved during the course of his career,25 but a consistent central 
proposition of his work maintains that any proper understanding of contracts as a 
social phenomenon needs to appreciate that they are embedded in social structures 
and norms.26  Macneil contrasted this contextual approach towards understanding 
contracts with the approach of classical contract law, which was said to look merely at 
the express contractual agreement, what the parties said or wrote, and not at the full 
context of their exchange relationship.  He labelled a thoroughly contextual approach 
that took into account all the implicit normative understandings between the parties 
the ‘relational contract’ approach.  He further insisted that for the purpose of 
understanding contracts, both sociologically and in law, there were some kinds of 
deeply embedded contracts, somewhat confusingly described as ‘relational contracts’, 
as opposed to discrete contracts, for which it was essential to investigate the whole 
context and the implicit norms extremely thoroughly in order to understand properly 
all the normative dimensions of the transaction.27    In contrast, such an extensive 
contextual exercise was mostly unnecessary for a complete understanding of simple 
discrete transactions such as the purchase of a newspaper at a kiosk.28  Those points 
created the impression that in Macneil’s view there exists an identifiable category of 
contracts that could be described as relational contracts, in which the appropriate legal 
method, unlike the normal method applicable for discrete contracts, should involve 
extensive examination of the implicit expectations of the parties.  But eventually, in 
                                                 
24
 Ian R Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations Under Classical, 
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 Nw U Law Rev 854. 
25
 The variations are expertly charted in David Campbell, ‘Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of 
Contract’ in David Campbell (ed) The Relational Theory of Contract: Selected Works of Ian Macneil 
(Sweet & Maxwell 2001) 3.  
26
 Ian R Macneil, The New Social Contract (Yale U P 1980); similar views can be found earlier in 
sociological studies of contracts: S Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business’ (1963) 28 
American Sociological Review 45; M Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The 
Problem of Embeddedness (1985) 91 American Journal of Sociology 481. 
27
 Ian R MacNeil, ‘Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries’ (2000) 94 Nw U Law Rev 
877, 881; Ian Macneil, quoted in Campbell (ed) The Relational Theory of Contract, above n 25, 368. 
28
 Ian R Macneil, ‘Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know’ (1985) Wisc Law Rev 483. 
 9 
response to criticism,29 it became apparent that such a sharp conceptual distinction 
was not what Macneil intended to say: he argued that the context of an exchange 
matters for an understanding of all contracts, because they are normally embedded in 
prior social relations.   His claim was rather that the focus of traditional contract law 
on the original express agreement between the parties might function reasonably 
successfully when applied to relatively short-term, discrete transactions, but in more 
complex, long-term, transactions that require co-operation and perhaps flexibility, to 
understand the expectations of the parties and how the transaction was supposed to 
function, the focus must be much broader and embrace the entire relationship between 
the parties as it has developed.30 
 
Although Macneil does not ultimately support the claim that there is a class of 
contracts that can properly be described as relational, he does suggest that at one end 
of a spectrum of types of contractual relationships, the relational end, the classical 
approach to the analysis of contracts will prove defective, because it fails to examine   
the unexpressed expectations of the parties and their implicit undertakings.  Macneil 
frequently offers the example of a contract of employment as one that usually lies at 
the relational end, because both employer and employee will have expectations that 
go beyond the formal exchange of work for wages, such as the expectation that the 
employee will work hard and be loyal to the interests of the employer. Those 
expectations will usually be protected by terms implied by law in the contract of 
employment.31  It seems that Macneil would favour interpretative techniques or 
implied terms that protected implicit expectations of this kind in other types of 
commercial transactions at the relational end of the spectrum.  Macneil does not 
automatically classify long-term contracts as relational contracts, though the two 
categories overlap and are frequently confused.32 It is certainly more likely in long-
term contracts such as employment and business franchises that the formal agreement 
will prove incomplete in its planning for future contingencies and that it will be 
appropriate for a court to flesh out the agreement by reference to implicit 
understandings and expectations.  Ultimately, however, Macneil fails to provide a 
description or paradigm of relational contracts: the category consists rather of those 
kinds of transactions where it is appropriate to embark upon a deeper investigation of 
the context in order to ascertain properly the implicit obligations and understandings 
that inform the contractual undertakings.   
 
 
Relational Contracts in Economic Theory 
 
The idea of relational contracts also appears in economic analysis of transactions.  
‘The literature on relational contracts is concerned with the impact of the ongoing 
nature of the relationship on trade between the parties, on their payoffs, on the nature 
of any legally enforceable contract used to supplement the relational contract, and on 
                                                 
29
 Eg David Campbell, ‘The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract’ in D Campbell and P 
Vincent-Jones (eds), Contract and Economic Organisation: Socio-Legal Initiatives (Dartmouth 1996) 
40.  
30
 Macneil (n 24) 890. 
31
 British Telecommunications plc v Ticehurst [1992] ICR 383 (CA). 
32
 Eg Lord Steyn Total Gas Marketing Ltd v. ARCO British Ltd and Others [1998] UKHL 22, [1998] 2 
Lloyds Rep 209; Ewan McKendrick, ‘The Regulation of Long Term Contracts in English law’, in J 
Beatson and D Friedman (eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (OUP 1995) 305. 
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the design of organizations.’33  The core insight of this analysis is that some 
transactions will be ‘self-enforcing’ in the sense that the pay-offs for both parties will 
usually be greater if the contract or business relationship is continued rather than 
discontinued, so they probably will perform their contracts as best they can and 
maintain their business relationship.34   
 
An example of this type of relational contract might be a ‘requirements contract’, 
under which a supplier agrees to meet all the customer’s needs for a product or 
service over a period of time if and when the purchaser chooses to place an order.  
Under the common law, owing to the absence of consideration in the form of a 
promise to buy something, such a requirements contract is unlikely to be legally 
enforceable. Even so, most suppliers regard requirements contracts as extremely 
beneficial,35 because in practice the agreement is likely to channel a lot of business 
between the firms, not because there is anything that is legally binding in the long-
term relationship, but because of the long-term economic incentives for both parties in 
nurturing and staying loyal to the business relationship.    It is the long-term economic 
interest of both parties in sharing the surplus arising from the relationship that binds 
the parties together and provides the crucial incentive to perform satisfactorily.   
 
A similar analysis can be applied to casual workers, including those working under 
‘zero hours contracts’, where strictly speaking there may not be a binding umbrella or 
long-term contract between the parties at all owing to the lack of consideration.36  In 
practice, despite the absence of legal sanctions, the casual worker is likely to enjoy 
stable employment because both parties have incentives to continue the relation: the 
employer wants to keep a regular pool of staff on which to draw and the worker needs 
a regular income each week.  This kind of legally unenforceable relational contract 
that is nevertheless a crucial and almost permanent business relationship was also at 
the heart of the dispute between a preferred supplier and a retail chain in Baird Textile 
Holdings v Marks & Spencer plc,37 a case to which we will return in a moment.   
 
The importance of the pay-offs from long-term business relationships as a self-
enforcing mechanism may also explain why, in the event of defective or tardy 
delivery of goods, businesses typically prefer to grant a discount on future orders from 
the injured party rather than offer immediate compensation.38  This behaviour fits into 
a more general observed pattern of the avoidance of litigation whenever a long-term 
business relation needs to be preserved,39 because the long-term pay-offs from future 
                                                 
33
 James M. Malcomson, ‘Relational Incentive Contracts’ in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds), 
The Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton UP 2012) 1014, 1015; J Levin, ‘Relational 
Incentive Contracts’ (2003) 93 American Economic Review 835. 
34
 L G Telser, ‘A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements’ (1980) 53 Journal of Business 27. 
35
 Stuart Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business’ (1963) 28 American Sociological Review 
45.  
36
 Carmichael v National Power plc [1999] ICR 1226 (HL). 
37
 [2001] EWCA Civ 274. 
38
 Levin, n 33, 836; H Beale and T Dugdale, ‘Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of 
Contractual Remedies’ (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45, 59; Comment, ‘The Statute of 
Frauds and the Business Community: A Re-Appraisal in Light of Prevailing Practices’ (1957) 66 Yale 
LJ 1038, 1061.  
39
 Stuart Macaulay, ‘An Empirical View of Contract’ (1985) Wisc Law Rev 465; Collins, Regulating 
Contracts, above n 10, 323-330. 
 11 
business deals are greater than any short-term gain from an insistence on contractual 
rights. 
 
The economic model of relational incentive contracts stresses the special importance 
of these contracts as a business framework in those instances where it may not be 
possible to measure and verify accurately whether the performance of the parties 
reaches the expected standards under the contract.  If the contract requires ‘best 
efforts’, ‘good faith’, or ‘innovation’ in performance, or confers a discretionary power 
to address future contingencies or reward good performance, it is not easy for the 
parties or a court to assess whether the expected standard has been met or the power 
exercised appropriately.  Where there are long-term pay-offs from meeting 
expectations as far as possible, either in the form of anticipated future business deals 
or perhaps receipt of a discretionary bonus payment, this relational incentive quality 
of the agreement is likely to avoid the need to litigate.40   
 
Where a legal dispute does arise, this economic theory might be interpreted as 
suggesting that a court should strive to ensure that the pay-offs are preserved in order 
to serve the goal of the reduction of litigation and the maintenance of the expected 
benefits from continuation of the business relationship.  A court might seek to imply 
terms that will sustain a relational contract even when the long-term pay-offs are 
relatively small and may not invariably be enough to provide a sufficient incentive to 
perform according to expectations.  For instance, a legal analysis might need to 
interpret the obligations of the parties under a binding contract in such a way that the 
legal duties do not permit one party to frustrate that logic of long-term pay-offs.  That 
analysis applies neatly to Yam Seng: by permitting stores in ordinary shopping malls 
to sell the product for less than the price in the duty free outlets, the action was bound 
to frustrate the commercial operation of the distributorship in duty-free shops before 
long by disrupting the pay-offs for the distributor. In cases where the performance 
expectation has probably been satisfied but the other party has declined to reward it 
by conferral of a discretionary bonus, it would be appropriate for a court to intervene, 
as they do, to prevent such an irrational exercise of a discretionary power.41      
 
A more puzzling situation for legal regulation concerns those long-term business 
relationships, such as a preferred supplier under a requirements arrangement, where 
there is arguably no binding long-term contract at all.  Economic relational contract 
theory tells us that these arrangements are self-enforcing because of the pay-offs 
arising from the business relationship in the long run.  But litigation will occur 
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presumably, as in Baird Textile Holdings v Marks & Spencer plc,42 when one party 
decides that the pay-offs arising from continuation of the business relationship are 
insufficient in comparison with alternative market opportunities and so walks away 
from the relationship.  Economic relational contract theory explains why it is perfectly 
sensible not to bother with a binding long-term contract when the pay-offs from the 
relationship are high, so it makes commercial sense to reach the legal conclusion that 
Marks & Spencer plc were not legally bound to a long-term contract.   On the other 
hand, it might be argued that Baird Textile was under a misapprehension, fostered by 
the conduct of Marks & Spencer, that those pay-offs that sustained this long-term 
business relationship were still in place, and so Marks & Spencer, if aware of this 
misapprehension, should perhaps have been under a duty to inform Baird Textile of 
the change of circumstances and their imminent exit from the supplier relationship.  A 
failure to do so at the earliest opportunity might justify a legal claim for compensation 
for wasted expenditure or missed opportunities to avoid loss that occurred whilst 
labouring under this misapprehension.43  Alternatively, this economic perspective 
might be used to justify an award of compensation to mimic what the parties already 
believed was present in their transaction,44 namely economic incentives to continue 
the relationship such as the profits that would have been made by the sale of products 
made by Baird Textile in the next season in the retail outlets of Marks and Spencer.   
In this context, the economic theory of relational contracts provides no ground for 
doubting that there was no long-term binding contract between the parties, as the 
English Court of Appeal decided, but does raise questions about whether the law, in 
providing support for relational transactions of this type, should not require disclosure 
as soon as possible of the vital information that the pay-offs that sustain the long-term 
business relationship are no longer believed to be present.  
 
 
Institutional Economics and Quasi-Integration 
 
Institutional economics argues that relational contracts provide a particular 
institutional structure for the organisation of production and the division of labour, 
which occupies a middle ground between markets and organisations (or firms).45  In 
markets, contracts for goods and services are made between parties with somewhat 
antagonistic interests in the sense that although both expect to be better off as a result 
of the exchange, their pay-offs from a particular transaction will depend to a 
considerable extent on reducing the benefit to the other party by for example paying a 
lower price for the goods and services provided by the other party.  Within 
organisations, however, though there is a network of contracts that bind the parties 
together, such as contracts of employment, share ownership, and directorships, some 
of these contracts are supplemented by a mechanism that requires co-operation from 
everyone to maximise the profits of the organisation itself, the profits then being 
distributed according to the remuneration formula set by the contracts.46 In the case of 
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employees, for instance, though their remuneration is in part determined by 
antagonistic bargaining with the employer about the amount of wages, the opportunity 
for the worker to earn higher pay is determined also in part in the long run by the 
efficiency and profitability of the organisation as a whole, which in turn may depend 
to some extent on the contribution and effort of the worker.  The law reflects the 
economic logic of the organisation by imposing duties of loyalty on its productive 
members: the directors of a company owe fiduciary duties, employees and managers 
duties of loyalty and good faith.  The crucial variable that determines the incidence of 
legal obligations of loyalty and co-operation is the point at which the contract falls on 
the spectrum between market and organisation.  International commodity sales are at 
the extreme market end of the spectrum and so give rise to no duties of loyalty and 
co-operation other than those explicitly agreed; business partnerships lie at the other 
organisational end and require a close approximation to fiduciary duties.   
 
Institutional economics is mostly focussed on the reasons for selecting a market or 
organisational framework.  Considerable emphasis is placed on the point that the costs 
of writing contracts or the inability to write complete contracts that deal adequately 
with every future contingency drive parties towards an institutional or organisational 
framework.  Given those problems, however, the parties may not need to or wish to 
integrate fully within a single organisation, but may prefer and be able to construct an 
intermediate position that might be described as a relational contract.  Goetz and Scott 
suggest how that problem of writing contracts to deal with contingencies explains the 
incidence of relational contracts,  
‘A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing 
important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. Such 
definitive obligations may be impractical because of inability to identify 
uncertain future conditions or because of inability to characterize complex 
adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves can be 
identified in advance.’47 
This description of a relational contract emphasises two problems.  The first concerns 
the task of addressing all future contingencies, which is a standard problem for any 
long-term transaction.  What makes relational contracts special is the second problem, 
which is the inability to plan completely through the express terms of the contract 
how to manage and adapt to even clearly foreseeable contingencies.  This second 
problem concerns the recognition that in an on-going relationship, co-operative 
changes will be required, though it is hard to say anything more specific than that.    
 
As a possible solution to both problems, the contract might confer power on one party 
to determine all the necessary interstitial adjustments, as in the case of the employer’s 
power to direct labour and the employee’s duty to comply with those instructions.  
Where such a dictatorial power or vertical integration is unacceptable, the parties to a 
contract must accept some kind of duty of co-operation or flexibility in order to secure 
the adaptations to the contract that are necessary for the success of the enterprise.  
Such a contract that requires co-operation and loyalty as an implicit obligation might 
be labelled as a hybrid or an instance of quasi-integration, for it borrows some 
elements of an integrated organisation in the form of obligations of loyalty and co-
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operation, whilst preserving most other features of standard market transactions.48 In 
business format franchise agreements such as fast food restaurants, for instance, the 
franchisor and franchisee remain separate business entities, but they co-operate for the 
purpose of marketing a product or service.  Both parties have an interest in 
maximising retail sales, for which purpose they will need to co-operate intensively, 
yet both parties have an interest in maximising their own returns on their investment 
by securing a greater share of the profits in the franchise agreement.  The underlying 
economic logic in these quasi-integration arrangements is driven both by the market 
and the organisation: parties must both compete and co-operate.49 
   
In Yam Seng v International Trade Corporation,50 Leggatt J identified franchises, 
joint ventures, and distributorships as examples of contracts where greater duties of 
co-operation and good faith arise.  Commercial agents should be added to the list.51  
From the perspective of institutional economics, the reason why these contracts 
require as normal incidents greater duties of loyalty and co-operation is not because 
they are long-term and not because the parties may have invested substantially in the 
project, though both of these features are likely to be present, but because the contract 
establishes a quasi-integrated system of relations of production with intensified 
contradictory pressures simultaneously both to co-operate and to compete in order to 
overcome problems of adaptation to foreseen and unforeseen contingencies. The 
economic logic of the relational contract is that both parties will be better off if they 
co-operate to maximise the size of the pie, such as sales in a franchise or distribution 
network, but simultaneously they still need to compete to obtain a greater slice of the 
profits arising from their labours.  Each party needs to be co-operative and loyal to the 
general aim of the networked business enterprise, whilst ensuring that it obtains a fair  
share of the rewards. These expectations of loyalty and co-operation within relational 
contracts must fall short of those applicable to organisations, however, for both parties 
remain residual profit-takers with antagonistic interests.  Loyalty is owed, not to each 
other, but rather to the relational contract itself as the embodiment of an independent 
business operation.52 
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This concept of a relational contract arguably fits the transactions in the trilogy of 
cases.  The distribution agreement in Yam Seng53 made no attempt to specify all the 
details of the performance required from both parties, so they would have to adjust the 
relationship according to the circumstances pertaining in the different retail locations.  
As well as the problem of greater discounts in ordinary shopping malls than those 
available at the airports, the supplier also discovered to its surprise that it required a 
special license to sell the fragrances in China and that it, as the manufacturer rather 
than the distributor, would have to acquire that license at considerable cost, an 
unexpressed obligation that it failed to fulfil.  Similarly, the joint venture in the Bristol 
Groundschool54 case could not specify exactly what was required to turn the product 
into digital form successfully, though clearly the parties would have to co-operate and 
disclose relevant information.  In D&G Cars v Essex Police,55 in some respects there 
is almost vertical integration arising from the contractor’s strict obligation to comply 
with the instructions of the police authority, breach of which even on a single 
occasion might destroy the mutual trust and confidence that was necessary for that 
relationship to continue.  At the same time, however, the contractor earned its 
remuneration by disposing of the cars at a profit or by making insurance claims, so 
that it was acting primarily on its own account.   
 
4.  The Paradigm of a Relational Contract 
 
These examinations of the trilogy of cases in the English High Court and social 
science theories of relational contracts may enable us now to give greater precision to 
a legal concept of a relational contract and its likely legal consequences.  To mine this 
social science material is complex both because it does not address normative 
questions about the appropriate kind of legal regulation and because different 
branches of the social sciences produce different paradigms of relational contracts or 
at least descriptions with very different emphases.  Even so, there seems to me to be 
sufficient overlap to create a productive synthesis. 
 
Indeterminate performance obligations 
 
Many descriptions of the concept of a relational contract commence with a statement 
that they are long-term contracts.  A reference to a long-term business relationship is 
central to the consideration of long-term pay-offs in the economic model and seems to 
figure strongly in the other analyses.  For Macneil, the need in relational contracts to 
examine the context of a contract and how its performance obligations evolved is only 
likely to arise in the context of a long-term contract.  Similarly, many of the co-
ordination problems that relational contracts as a form of quasi-integration are 
designed to address arise from the inability to specify in advance contract terms that 
deal with unforeseen contingencies or contingencies that will require adaptation.  The 
contracts involved in the trilogy of cases where the concept of relational contracts was 
employed by the High Court were all expected to last over many years. 
 
However, in the social science literature a long-term contract is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the presence of a relational contract.  The necessary long-term business 
relationship could be constructed from an unenforceable business relationship such as 
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a requirements agreement or an umbrella agreement for casual work, or it could 
comprise a succession of almost identical short-term contracts such as repeated orders 
for goods of a particular type from a specified seller.  Conversely, it is quite possible 
that a long-term supply contract could have hardly any relational qualities, but be 
regarded instead as creating at arms length limited and determinate obligations 
between the producer and the customer.56 Similarly, a syndicated loan agreement with 
a term of 20 years or a mobile phone service contract for three years could have none 
of the features of a relational contract.    
 
What does seem to be important in the social science description of relational 
contracts is that the terms of the contract use indeterminate descriptions of the 
expected performance obligations, in part because contingencies cannot always be 
foreseen, but more importantly because the precise needs for co-operation cannot be 
described clearly in advance, but will necessarily emerge during performance of the 
contract.   The presence of vague terms in a contract does not, of course, make it a 
necessarily a relational contract: it could be simply a poorly drafted one.  But 
indeterminacy with respect to performance obligations is a necessary feature of 
relational contracts.  This indeterminacy may be discovered in vague terms, general 
expressions of intention, gaps regarding important matters, statements of the kind that 
the parties will use best endeavours to achieve a goal or deal with contingencies, and 
explicit references to good faith in performance.     
 
This important distinction between determinate and indeterminate long-term contracts 
lay at the heart of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Mid Essex Hospital Services 
NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest).57 In this contract for 
the provision by a private contractor of cleaning services to a public hospital, the 
express terms of the long-term contract specified detailed regulation of the 
contractor’s duties and how defects in performance should be treated through a 
penalty points system, though the contract did require good faith from one of the 
parties in respect of some aspects of performance.  The Court of Appeal rejected any 
suggestion of a general duty to perform the contract in good faith.    The court held 
that the contract provide a complete and measurable set of requirements for 
performance by the contractor, so that additional obligations of co-operation and good 
faith were unnecessary for business efficacy except where the parties had expressly 
provided for them.   This rejection the application of the concept of a relational 
contract or the legal standards associated with that concept seems to have been 
appropriate, for the contract, though involving some integration into the functioning 
of the hospital, was not an instance of quasi-integration that depended upon duties of 
co-operation and loyalty, but remained an arms length market contract.  There was no 
lack of specificity in the terms of the contract in dealing with contingencies, so the 
court could eventually without much difficulty secure to each party their determinate 
entitlements under the contract.  So this contract could not be classified as a relational 
contract from the perspective of the social science literature, and that view was 
followed implicitly by the Court of Appeal.  Whether or not it makes sense to try to 
deliver public services through discrete contracts is, of course, another question.58  In 
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addition, the Court of Appeal appears to have attached no significance to the point 
that there had been a breakdown of mutual trust and confidence between the parties, a 
matter that was regarded as crucial in D & G Cars because it was a public service 
contract.   
 
Commitment 
 
Another factor often used to describe a relational contract is what Leggatt J referred to 
as a ‘substantial commitment’ by both parties to the contract.  However, this feature 
does not figure significantly in the social science literature regarding the concept of 
relational contracts and may be misleading.  It is true that some economic theories 
predict that at a certain point the level of investments sunk irretrievably into a project 
will become so great that the parties will prefer the security and control of a single 
corporate organisation,59 but until that point is reached, the contractual framework of 
a joint venture or another type of relational contract should provide adequate 
protection for those investments.60  At the core of the idea of quasi-integration is 
certainly an idea that both parties will have to make a contribution to the successful 
outcome and in that sense make a commitment.  It also seems to be the case that 
usually, if the parties commit to this relationship, either expressly or by implication, 
they are not supposed to commit to a rival business relationship such a competing 
franchise.  Yet the commitment may not have to be in the form of an investment that 
might be lost by premature termination of the contract, but may rather take the form 
of investments in skills and know-how.  After a period of time in a successful 
relationship, it may become tempting to the parties to seek to improve their share of 
the rewards of their co-operation by threatening to exit from the business relationship.  
That kind of strategic behaviour does not appear to be unique to relational contracts 
and indeed may be rarer given the potential pay-offs for both parties from continuing 
the business relationship.   
 
Although it may be correct that parties to relational contracts often make substantial 
commitments, that element does not seem to be an essential feature of these 
transactions.  In the trilogy of cases, the entrepreneur in Yam Seng had spent time and 
effort establishing a distribution network at the airports, but had not made significant 
financial investments.  There was a substantial investment by the defendant IT 
company in the development of a software programme in Bristol Groundschool and 
once the joint venture was established successfully, there was certainly a risk of 
strategic behaviour, which may have been the reason why the defendant 
surreptitiously seized the software platform as a kind of anticipatory retaliation.  That 
kind of risk of behaviour that destroys mutual trust and confidence can be addressed 
by vertical integration,61 though at the cost of losing the incentive structures of a 
market transaction.  D&G Cars seem not to have made significant new investments to 
take on the disposal work for the police.  For these reasons, the proposed feature for 
relational contracts of a ‘substantial commitment’ may not be a useful descriptive 
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criterion, since it probably applies more broadly to long-term contracts, though in so 
far as it indicates a commitment to the success of the business relationship itself, it is 
likely to be a feature of relational contracts. 
 
Indeterminacy and Expectations 
 
That last remark brings us to the most puzzling aspect of constructing a paradigm for 
a relational contract, which concerns the dimension of psychological attitude or 
expectations.  A hall-mark of relational contracts is that the parties do not regard their 
written contract as a more or less complete statement of their rights and obligation, 
but expect that these obligations will evolve and be refined as the project develops.  
These expectations, though implicit, are nevertheless essential for business efficacy 
and the success of the project in the long run.  Indeed, as Macaulay suggested, the 
parties may regard these commercial expectations as the central governing norms of 
their business relationship and will conform to those standards even when the written 
contractual obligations appear to point in a different direction.62  Where Macneil 
seems to have gone wrong in his analysis of relational contracts is that he argued that 
the source of legal rules to govern relational contracts should be general norms of 
reciprocal exchange behaviour.63  Whilst it may be true that implicit obligations in 
relational contracts may include generally shared values such as honesty and 
reciprocity, that is not a special feature of relational contracts.  The distinctive 
expectations or implicit obligations of relational contracts will arise from the crevices 
and dynamics of a particular contractual relationship, and, as Leggatt J suggests in 
Yam Seng, 64 will typically be justified in accordance with the ‘business necessity’ test 
used for the ad hoc insertion of terms implied in fact.65  We should accept, therefore, 
that it will be a distinctive feature of the paradigm of a relational contract that these 
implicit undertakings or expectations will play a pivotal role in shaping the business 
relationship and guiding performance of the contract.  While some implicit 
obligations will be present in all transactions, in relational contracts, where it is not 
possible to specify in verifiable detail in advance all aspects of performance during 
the productive activity, the parties will rely more heavily on these implicit 
expectations of cooperation, honesty, and loyalty to shape performance obligations.   
 
To sum up this analysis of the paradigm of a relational contract for the purpose of 
developing a legal concept, we have identified three key aspects.  First, there is a long 
term business relationship that will provide sufficient pay-offs to both parties to 
continue with the relationship even through periods of considerable adversity.  
Second, obtaining the benefits of the business relationship will require adaptation, 
cooperation, and evolution of performance obligations, so that indeterminate implicit 
obligations of this kind must be central to the deal.  Third, these implicit 
indeterminate obligations must be understood as arising not from general moral 
standards or norms of reciprocity such as honesty, but will be tailored to achieve what 
is necessary to secure the success of the venture.  Business necessity in this context 
requires the acceptance of obligations derived from the general concepts of co-
operation and loyalty or commitment to the project.   
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5. Legal Consequences of Relational Contracts 
 
 
Assuming we have constructed from the legal and social science materials a workable 
paradigm for relational contracts, it remains to identify the key legal consequences 
that will flow from the application of the legal concept of a relational contract.  The 
most important legal consequence is that the approach to the interpretation of 
relational contracts must be relatively contextual.  Given that implicit obligations 
regarding co-operation and trustworthiness are central to the economic dynamic of 
these transactions, when a court encounters such a transaction it should be appropriate 
to examine the whole context with a view to identifying not only the explicit 
obligations in any written documents but also the implicit expectations that were 
formed at the commencement of the contract and during its performance.  To ignore 
those implicit obligations that form the life-blood of relational contracts and to adopt 
a purely formal approach that only examines the written contract would not be even 
close to an interpretation of the intentions and expectations of the parties.  Such an 
interpretation would not match up to a ‘business common sense’ interpretation of the 
contract.66     
 
Most lawyers accept today that it is necessary to have regard to the context of 
transaction in order to understand the meaning of the express terms.67 But the 
proposal advanced here is to go further and search the context for additional 
obligations that the parties recognise implicitly in their dealings but have not included 
in their contract.  This proposed method is much more controversial, because it 
weakens the privileged position of the written text of the contract under classical 
contract law and as a consequence may render litigation more protracted.68  
Advocates of traditional formalist interpretations of contracts argue that judges should 
stick to the written text of the contract, even in relational contracts, because courts 
lack the skills and information to go much beyond it, and that any such adventures 
will make the law less predictable and increase the costs of litigation.69  Such fidelity 
to the written text will also encourage the parties to address foreseeable problems 
explicitly in their contracts, which will in turn reduce the need for litigation.  In 
response to these points, we must remember firstly that a defining feature of relational 
contracts is the necessary indeterminacy of performance obligations, even for 
foreseeable risks, so that the option of more comprehensive explicit contracts is not 
available.  Secondly, given that the long-term business relationship relies for its 
existence and success on the acceptance by the parties of indeterminate obligations of 
co-operation and trustworthiness, unless the law insists on incorporating these implicit 
expectations in any interpretation of the obligations arising from a contract, it will 
become a rogue’s charter by permitting opportunists and the unscrupulous to act in 
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ways that fall below the reasonable expectations of the parties and the normal 
standards of commercial propriety.  Whilst it is important for a court to examine 
carefully the express terms of any relational contract, the process of construction 
should not halt there, for in relational contracts the written express terms should be 
regarded as the tip of an iceberg of implicit undertakings that may further evolve 
during the performance of the contract.   
 
In trying to describe this contextual approach to the interpretation of relational 
contracts in another paper on contracts of employment,70 my suggestion was that a 
court should view a relational contract such as a the contract of employment in three 
dimensions.  The first dimension that court should consider is the express terms in 
written contract, to which could be added any interpretations or implied terms that can 
be regarded as necessary additional implications to make sense of the explicit terms.  
Then, secondly, the court should enquire whether there might be additional implicit 
obligations that arise from the employment relationship if it was expected to last for a 
period of time or indefinitely.  This second enquiry tries to match the obligations of 
the contract with the long-term pay-offs that were anticipated from the long-term 
contract or relationship.  That dimension of the employment relationship might be 
exemplified by deferred expectations of remuneration such as bonuses, a pension 
entitlement, or promotions.  The third dimension concerns trust or the preservation of 
the relationship itself, or what is sometimes called in connection with employment the 
‘psychological contract’.71  An implied term of mutual trust and confidence or a duty 
to perform in good faith is the normal legal mechanism that tries to articulate in the 
contract of employment and other relational contracts expectations of fair and 
equitable treatment, respect for human rights and difference, and obligations of 
loyalty to the relationship on both sides.   
 
Although it is a challenging process of legal reasoning for a court to take into account 
all three dimensions of the interpretation of contracts of employment at the same time, 
failure to do so is likely to produce a result that is perceived to be unjust to one of the 
parties because it deviates too much from their multi-dimensional expectations.    
Once that three dimensional approach to the interpretation of relational contracts is 
accepted, it suggests further that we should expect in relational contracts the 
development of implied or perhaps sometimes mandatory terms that try to articulate 
and defend the second and third dimensions of relational contracts that comprise 
implicit expectations about long-term pay-offs and trustworthy behaviour. 
 
For the second dimension, the relevant implied obligations can be loosely gathered 
together under a heading of a duty of co-operation for the purpose of achieving the 
long-term goals of the business relationship.  Each project or type of relational 
contract may require particular instances of this general implied obligation for the 
purpose of supporting the co-operative goal.  In contracts of employment this duty to 
cooperate is described as an obligation ‘to serve the employer faithfully with a view to 
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promoting those commercial interests for which he is employed.’72 In a distributorship 
such as the one involved in Yam Seng, in the view of the court, cooperation required 
honesty in communications, some disclosure of vital information, and a degree of 
loyalty to the project in the sense of avoiding actions that would defeat its business 
objectives.   In a franchise operation, the duty of loyalty might comprise a duty not to 
undermine the business reputation of the franchise business or, as in Shell UK Ltd v 
Lostock Garage Ltd,73 a duty not to favour in-house retail outlets and large 
franchisees with large rebates whilst refusing them to small independent franchisees 
with little bargaining power, thereby forcing them to run their businesses at a loss, 
though only Bridge LJ accepted the existence of an implied duty of loyalty in that 
case.  
 
For the third dimension of interpretation of a relational contract, which tries to protect 
the trust on which the long-term relationship must be based, the appropriate implied 
term will include honesty in communications, but beyond that it is likely to include a 
duty of fair dealing and the avoidance of actions that are calculated to destroy mutual 
trust and confidence.  As we have already noted, such obligations are not designed to 
impose moral standards on the parties to relational contracts.  The aim is rather to 
provide support for what is a business necessity in these contracts, which is a measure 
of trust and fair dealing.  In the employment context it is evident that once there has 
been a complete breakdown of mutual trust and confidence, there is no way back to an 
efficient and effective employment relationship.  Where successful performance of a 
commercial contract requires intense cooperation to a degree analogous with 
employment within a business, it is understandable that once suspicions of dishonesty, 
cheating, and opportunism begin to poison a relationship, there may be no way of 
retrieving the situation and proceeding with the project together.  Even a single act of 
misconduct that has no adverse financial or reputational consequences for the other 
party may be sufficient to destroy mutual trust and confidence and prevent any 
workable continuation of the relational contract.  In both Bristol Groundschool and D 
& G Cars, once the trickery had been exposed, the other party was not prepared to 
continue the relationship even though the long-term pay-offs might have been 
unaffected.  Sometimes this breach of trust may be described as an act of disloyalty, 
not really meaning disloyalty to the other party, but rather disloyalty to the project by 
conduct such as helping a competitor that is almost certainly bound to frustrate the 
objectives of the long-term business relationship.   
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Is the phrase ‘relational contract’ now a legal concept?  Although it is at an incipient 
stage, the building blocks of a legal concept of a relational contract seem to be in 
place.  I have proposed a paradigm description of the three principal features of a 
relational contract that include a long-term business relationship in which 
indeterminate implicit expectations and obligations are essential to its successful 
performance.   With respect to the legal consequences that flow from the application 
of the concept, my analysis supports what was described at the outset as a loose legal 
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concept that points towards an approach rather than dictates particular rules.  Under 
this looser legal concept, for relational contracts courts should pursue a more 
contextual approach towards interpretation.  This approach should in addition to 
taking full account of the express terms of the contract give equal weight to the 
dimensions of supporting the long-term pay-offs of the business relationship and 
preserving the necessary trust within the relationship.  That task should usually be 
accomplished by implied terms that seek to articulate obligations of co-operation in 
support of the long-term pay-offs and obligations of mutual trust and confidence to 
preserve the necessary trust between the parties.  Notice that these legal consequences 
do not include necessarily a requirement of good faith in performance, whether 
optional or mandatory, though certainly conduct that might be described as bad faith 
might be challenged as behaviour that undermines co-operation or is calculated to 
destroy mutual trust and confidence.   
 
